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THE CASE FOR TAX SPARING ALONG WITH EXPANDING
AND LIMITING THE SUBPART F REGIME
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am particularly happy to participate in this important confer-
ence at The George Washington University School of Law. I feel as
though I am caught in the middle of bipolar, policy approaches to
international tax, championed by two outstanding George Wash-
ington Law School professors of international tax, Professor Robert
Peroni and Professor Karen Brown. Professor Peroni has argued
persuasively that the United States should end deferral, a policy
under which U.S.-controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) are gen-
erally not subject to U.S. taxation until the earnings are distrib-
uted, essentially by adopting the partnership model for taxing the
foreign source income of CFCs.1
On the other hand, Professor Brown has made compelling argu-
ments for the adoption of an exemption system for investment in
developing countries (DCs), particularly those in Africa.2 Under
an exemption system, CFCs would not be subject to taxation in the
United States, either at the time that foreign income is earned or
at the time that such income is repatriated. Professor Brown's pro-
posed exemption system would have an effect similar to that of a
tax sparing policy. Under a tax sparing policy, pursuant to a treaty,
for foreign tax credit purposes, the United States would treat CFCs
as having paid the full foreign tax on foreign income, even though
the income is subject to a lower tax pursuant to a tax holiday.
The George Washington University School of Law is, indeed,
privileged to have these two outstanding international tax scholars
on its faculty. This Symposium is also privileged to host Professor
Paul McDaniel, the author of an important and excellent paper
* Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Mergers and Acquisitions at
the UCLA School of Law. I would like to thank Robert Clary, II, a third year student at the
University of Miami School of Law and Ellis Green, my assistant at the UCLA School of
Law, for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't
Mend It-Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1609 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accom-
modate Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 45 (2002).
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entitled The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in
Developing Countries.3 I am, indeed, honored to have the opportu-
nity to offer the following comments on Professor McDaniel's Arti-
cle and to set forth my views on both the need for reform of the
Subpart F regime and on the advisability of the adoption by the
U.S. Treasury of a tax sparing policy.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief com-
ment on the current deferral system; Part III addresses the eco-
nomic case for a tax sparing policy; Part IV provides a brief
examination of Professor McDaniel's policy options; and Part V
sets out the author's policy prescription.
II. COMMENT ON THE CURRENT DEFERRAL SYSTEM
I would like to start with a comment on the economic effect of
the current system of deferral. Professor McDaniel claims that the
current U.S. system prevents DCs from offering tax incentives, like
tax holidays, to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) .4 I have a
small quibble with this statement, a quibble that goes to the heart
of the deferral concept. I believe that his characterization is a bit
too broad because, under the current deferral system for active
income, tax incentives will provide an advantage as long as the
income is not repatriated. As Professor McDaniel points out, long-
term deferral approximates the benefits of exemption because of
the lack of an interest charge on the deferral benefit.
I believe that it is fair to say that the current deferral system is
not, in and of itself, enough to encourage investment in DCs, even
with substantial tax incentives. Subject to the Subpart F inclusion
rules, the current deferral regime is available for CFCs wherever
the foreign investment exists; therefore, the current deferral
regime does not offer a greater incentive for investment in DCs
than does investment in developed countries that offer tax incen-
tives. Finally, it is important to remember that the deferral regime
applies not just to tax holidays; it also applies to any situation in
which the foreign corporate tax rate is lower than the U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate, such as with Ireland's 10% corporate tax rate.
3. Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Develop-
ing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 265 (2003).
4. Id.
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III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX SPARING FOR
THE ATTRACTION OF FDI IN DCs
In addressing the question of whether tax sparing benefits or
other incentives should be made available to DCs, it seems that the
first issue is whether it is important for a DC to be concerned about
the level of its inbound FDI. I believe that the answer is a resound-
ing "Yes." For example, the 1998 article, How Does Foreign Invest-
ment Affect Economic Growth, cited by Professor McDaniel, firmly
establishes that FDI contributes to economic growth. The authors,
Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, point out that:
[o] ur results suggest that FDI is in fact an important vehicle for
the transfer of technology, contributing to growth in larger mea-
sure than domestic investment .... [T]here is a strong compli-
mentary effect between FDI and human capital .... Our results
are supportive of a crowding-in effect, that is, a one-dollar
increase in the net inflow of FDI is associated with an increase in
total investment in the host country of more than one dollar.5
This is a logical conclusion and it would appear that any rational
finance minister, especially a finance minister in a DC, must be
concerned with attracting FDI. Indeed, this was my personal expe-
rience while working, on behalf of the U.S. Treasury Department,
as the Tax Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Finance in South Africa
from 1999 to 2000. Thus, I think that it is crystal clear that FDI is
an important element in the economic growth strategies of many
DCs. The next question is whether either tax sparing benefits or a
selective exemption system for DCs, like the one proposed by Pro-
fessor Brown, could be effective in attracting FDI. Professor
McDaniel cites the 1998 article by Hines, Tax Sparing and Direct
Investment in Developing Countries, finding that tax sparing benefits
are effective in stimulating FDI. 6 For example, Hines writes:
[t] he results indicate that "tax sparing" is effective in stimulating
FDI. Japanese firms locate a much higher fraction of their for-
eign investment in countries with whom Japan has tax sparing
agreements than do American firms. Furthermore, host govern-
ments appear to grant Japanese firms significant tax reductions
that are not available to their American counterparts. All other
things equal, tax sparing agreements are associated with 140%
to 240% higher FDI levels and 23% lower tax rates on FDI.7
Further, it seems logical to conclude that the significant reduc-
tions in tax that can result from tax sparing would be effective in
5. Id. at 117-18.
6. james R. Hines, Jr., "Tax Sparing" and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 1998
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6728.
7. Id. at 3.
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attracting FDI. I believe that the previously mentioned economic
studies of the effectiveness of FDI and tax sparing lead to some
important conclusions. First, the adoption by the United States of
a tax sparing policy, or similar selective exemption policy, as pro-
posed by Professor Brown, would likely increase the amount of
U.S. source FDI flowing to a host DC that received the benefits of
such a policy. Second, this increased FDI would likely increase the
rate of domestic investment and economic growth in the host DC.
IV. AN ExAMINATION OF PROFESSOR MCDANIEL'S POLICY OPTIONS
Given this background, let me turn to an examination of the
various policy options analyzed by Professor McDaniel in his Arti-
cle.8 I will begin by noting those points as to which Professor
McDaniel and I reasonably agree at certain levels. Specifically, I
will address the reduction of U.S. corporate tax on income earned
in DCs, the relaxation of Subpart F rules, and the modification of
Section 482. First, Professor McDaniel concludes that reducing the
U.S. corporate tax on income earned in DCs is unlikely to be more
effective than an exemption system. Although I do not support
this type of policy approach, it would appear that such an approach
could be designed to reach the same or similar result to that pro-
vided by tax sparing or an exemption system. Second, I agree with
Professor McDaniel's finding that a relaxation of the Subpart F
rules for investment in DCs would not likely be effective. This type
of policy would unlikely increase economic growth in DCs and
would permit DCs to be used as mere tax havens for economic
activity occurring in other countries. Third, I agree with Professor
McDaniel's conclusion that modifying the Section 482 transfer
pricing rules for investment in DCs is not an appropriate policy. In
addition to violating the WTO, such an approach would unlikely
increase economic growth in DCs.
Below, I will address those of Professor McDaniel's contentions
with which I take issue, including the exemption system, tax spar-
ing, and the suggestion of increased official development aid
(ODA).
A. Exemption System
Professor McDaniel argues that an exemption system for invest-
ment in DCs is unlikely to increase FDI flowing into DCs, so long as
the current, U.S.-modified worldwide system (i.e., the CFC regime)
8. McDaniel, supra note 3, at 285-94.
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is in effect. I think that his conclusion is inconsistent with findings
in the Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee study discussed in Part IV on
the effect of tax sparing on FDI. '- Although I am not aware of any
studies on the effect of a selective exemption system on FDI, Hines'
Tax Sparing study seems to logically apply to a selective exemption
system. It is noteworthy, however, that if the United States were to
adopt a generalized exemption system for all FDI, as has been pro-
posed recently by some international tax professionals, so that the
exemption applied without respect to the location of the invest-
ment, then I would agree that such a system would unlikely be
effective in attracting FDI to DCs. Although, as indicated below, I
recommend the adoption of a selective tax sparing system, I do not
support a generalized exemption system for investment in DCs.
B. Tax Sparing Approach
Professor McDaniel opposes a tax sparing approach. He argues
that there are many obstacles to this approach, including the fol-
lowing: (1) general ineffectiveness; (2) the inability of DCs to
implement exchange of information agreements and source rules;
(3) the limited resources in the Treasury's International Tax Coun-
sel's (ITC) office; and (4) the complexity associated with such a
system. I will address each of these concerns in turn.
First, I think Professor McDaniel's conclusion regarding the
effectiveness of tax sparing is inconsistent with the previously dis-
cussed findings concerning the relationship between FDI and tax
sparing. Second, as I will propose below, tax sparing should only
be available to those DCs that can properly implement information
exchange agreements and otherwise provide proper administra-
tion of the tax system. Based on my experience serving as the Tax
Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Finance in South Africa, I also
believe that the United States could help these DCs dramatically
improve their tax systems. If the United States were to adopt a tax
sparing policy for DCs that adhere to principles of good govern-
ment, the DCs would both be able to and have an incentive to com-
ply with their information exchange obligations. My experience in
South Africa leads me to conclude that many DCs would welcome
our assistance in this regard.
Third, regarding Professor McDaniel's point on a lack of
resources, certainly, if the U.S. decided to adopt a tax sparing pol-
icy, it could find the resources to enhance the ITC office so that we
9. Id. at 283.
2003]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
could implement an effective tax sparing policy. The same is true
of a selective exemption system. Fourth, I believe that Professor
McDaniel's position on the complexity of a tax sparing regime is
one that essentially ignores the finding of the Hines study regard-
ing the Japanese system. Clearly, if the Japanese can adopt an
effective tax sparing policy, the United States can do the same.
Finally, although the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is opposed to what it refers to as "Harmful
Tax Competition,""' a recent study by the OECD is quite balanced
in its assessment of tax sparing.I l For example, the report con-
cludes: "The analysis of this report does not suggest that OECD
and other countries which have traditionally granted tax sparing
should necessarily cease to do so."12 The report goes on to urge
countries that employ tax sparing to "achieve a better targeting of
the provisions and to reduce the potential for abuse."'13
C. Suggestion for More ODA
As an alternative to providing tax incentives for investment in
DCs, Professor McDaniel suggests increasing ODA. This sugges-
tion is consistent with United Nations proposals that each devel-
oped country devote 0.7 percent of its GNP to ODA. 14 I agree that
there should be more ODA, and the United States' current contri-
bution is much too low, at 0.2 percent of GNP, or $4 per taxpayer.
But the political scene in the U.S. makes a substantial increase in
ODA unlikely. Although ODA clearly should be increased, it is also
true that U.S. companies may earn substantial benefits by investing,
through properly targeted and focused tax sparing agreements, in
active business operations in DCs. As indicated above, there is eco-
nomic evidence that an increase in FDI increases economic
growth. Accordingly, I do not think that an obvious need for an
increase in ODA can be used as a basis for not supporting a prop-
erly structured tax sparing policy.
10. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 7 (1998).
11. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX SPARING: A
RECONSIDERATION (1998).
12. Id. at 42.
13. Id.
14. See generally McDaniel, supra note 3, at 278-79.
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V. MY POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
In this section, I begin by outlining the reasons why I think we
should retain the current deferral system and not adopt Professor
Peroni's anti-deferral regime, which is fundamentally inconsistent
with providing any type of tax incentives for investment in DCs.
Second, I address changes in the current Subpart F regime for
CFCs that I think are needed, even if a tax sparing approach is
adopted. Finally, I provide the general structure of a targeted and
focused tax sparing program that could be implemented through
the Treasury's treaty policy. This tax sparing program would not
apply to income otherwise subject to taxation under the Subpart F
regime, as proposed to be modified here.
A. Continuation of the Present Deferral System
Although I see the logic in ending deferral along the lines pro-
posed by Professor Peroni, I believe that such a policy may run the
risk of hurting competitiveness of U.S. firms. For example, assume
that a U.S. firm is competing for an industrial project in a foreign
country that has a corporate tax rate below the U.S. rate or in a
foreign country that is offering a tax holiday for the project. Also
assume that the foreign competitors for the project are located in
countries that have exemption systems. Under the anti-deferral
regime proposed by Professor Peroni, the U.S. firm is at a tax dis-
advantage. Under the current deferral system, the U.S. firm is on
the same footing as the foreign competitors at the time the income
is earned and as long as the income is reinvested and not repatri-
ated. If the income is reinvested for a significant period, the defer-
ral facilitates an effect like that of exemption, thus reducing the
competitive advantage of the foreign competitor.
With proper planning, repatriation of the income may be done
at a time when other high taxed foreign income is repatriated,
thereby using cross-crediting, under the foreign tax credit rules,
that generates the same effect as an exemption system. This dem-
onstrates that the current deferral system already addresses many
of the concerns that the Nation Foreign Trade Council (NFTC)
and others have expressed with competitiveness.' 5 I would thus
retain our current deferral system with the modifications suggested
below.
15. Basically, the argument is that the current CFC regime puts U.S. firms doing busi-
ness in foreign markets at a competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign competitors
that are located in countries without CFC regimes. See aLho NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE
COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (Dec. 15, 2001).
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B. Expansion of and Limitation on the Subpart F Regime
I would both expand and limit the current Subpart F regime,
pursuant to which the Subpart income of CFCs is currently
imputed to certain controlling U.S. shareholders, thus denying the
benefits of deferral. In order to take pressure off of the Section
482 transfer pricing rules, which are complex and difficult to
administer, I would offer two suggestions. First, I would expand
the definition of Subpart F income for outbound sales from U.S.
parents to their CFCs. Second, I would consider limiting the defi-
nition of Subpart F income for foreign to foreign sales transac-
tions, pursuant to which such income arises on sales by one CFC to
a sister CFC where the sister sells the product outside of the coun-
try in which the sister is incorporated.' 6
First, with respect to outbound sales, the Subpart F regime
should be expanded to include within foreign base company sales
income (FBCSI) 17 and, therefore, Subpart F Income, all outbound
sales by U.S. parent corporations (and their controlled U.S. subsid-
iaries) to their CFCs. This rule should apply without respect to
where the product is resold by the CFC. Under the current defini-
tion of FBCSI, such transactions produce FBCSI only if the sale
takes place outside of the country in which the CFC is incorpo-
rated. Under this proposal, for example, FBCSI would include
income realized on the CFC's purchase of property from its U.S.
parent and from the sale by the CFC of the property in the country
of its incorporation. Presently, such income is not included in
FBCSI because of the requirement that the sale take place outside
of the country of incorporation of the CFC. This proposed exten-
sion of the FBCSI rules would take pressure off of Section 482 in
the outbound context, while preserving deferral for real business
activity in foreign countries, thus addressing the basic concern with
competitiveness.
Second, with respect to the foreign to foreign Subpart F provi-
sions, consideration should be given to relaxing these rules to the
extent that there is no Section 482 issue. This would address the
essential competitiveness concerns set out in the NFTC Study.
16. Samuel C. Thompson Jr., A Critical Perspective on the Thomas Bill, 96 TAX NOTES 581
(2002) (presenting similar suggestions for expanding and limiting the Subpart F regime);
see aLso Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Inversion Hearings Focus on Wrong Issues, 27 TAx NOTES
INT'L 193 (2002).
17. I.R.C. § 954(a)(2) (2000).
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C. Adoption of a Focused Tax Sparing Regime
I would adopt a focused tax sparing program for investment in
certain DCs. The Treasury treaty program would implement the
system with benefits that would apply only to active income earned
in the applicable DC. The system would not apply to income
earned from sales of property between the U.S. parent and the for-
eign subsidiary, i.e., income that would give rise to FBCSI under
the proposed modification discussed above or to any other type of
Subpart F income. Therefore, tax sparing would not apply to sales
of property that would otherwise be subject to Section 482.
The U.S. Treasury would also limit tax sparing benefits to those
countries that meet certain minimum standards, including: (1) a
commitment to basic democratic principles; (2) a commitment to
basic human rights protections; (3) an effective tax system and
information exchange program; (4) an adoption of good corpo-
rate governance principles; (5) compliance with environmental
best practices; (6) compliance with basic labor law principles; (7)
an adoption of anti-corruption policies, and (8) the satisfaction of
other good government principles. The Treasury would consult
with other branches of government in determining if the relevant
parties satisfied all eight conditions. Thus, that benefits of this pro-
vision would only be available for those DCs that practiced good
government principles, and it would be a carrot attracting commit-
ments to good government.
The following example illustrates the basic operation of this type
of system. Assume that tax sparing benefits are extended by treaty
to country DCX and that GM, a U.S. corporation, sets up, in DCX,
an auto-manufacturing subsidiary, GMX. GMX makes no
purchases of products from GM that would generate FBCSI under
the rules suggested above, and GMX has no other Subpart F
income. GMX manufactures the automobiles that are sold in
DCX. The corporate tax rate in DCX is generally 35%; however,
pursuant to a tax holiday for a period of ten years, DCX imposes a
tax rate of only 10% on the income earned by GMX. For the cur-
rent year, GMX has $100M of taxable income and pays $10M of
income tax to DCX. When GM repatriates the $90M of after tax
income from GMX, GM would not be subject to taxation on the
$90M because, under the tax sparing principle, the income is
deemed to have incurred a 35% corporate tax rate in DCX. Thus,
the economic effect of conferring tax sparing benefits is the same
as an exemption for the income earned by GMX in DCX. Without
this system, assuming that GM's only foreign income was the
2003]
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amount repatriated, under the indirect foreign tax credit provi-
sions in Section 902, GM would then be subject to a tax of $25M on
the repatriated amount, i.e., the difference between the 10% rate
in DCX and the 35% U.S. rate.' 8
This approach is consistent with the competitiveness concept,
because it would offer U.S. firms doing business in such countries
the same or similar benefits as those received by competing foreign
firms that also benefit from tax sparing. Further, this concept can
be justified on efficiency grounds. By promoting economic growth
in DCs, this concept is likely to enhance long-term economic effi-
ciency. Concededly, the distortion in investment decisions that
this type of policy would encourage through its reduction in short-
term worldwide welfare, might hurt economic efficiency. The pol-
icy is, however, likely to promote long tern economic efficiency,
because it helps DCs in growing their economies more effectively.
The accelerating economic growth of DCs will make worldwide
welfare greater in the long run.
VI. CONCLUSION
The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrate that we cannot
expect to live in prosperity while others live in abject poverty. Just
as after World War II, when the United States wisely adopted poli-
cies to help rebuild the economies of Germany and Japan, it would
be prudent for the United States to adopt policies to help build the
economies of DCs. A focused tax sparing program could be a pow-
erful tool in this economic building process, and it is clearly worth
the effort to pursue this policy option on the basis outlined in this
Comment. The tax sparing program proposed here should not be
viewed, however, as a substitute for other forms of foreign assis-
tance, such as ODA.
My proposal for a focused tax sparing program is not inconsis-
tent with my support for anti-inversion legislation, which would
prevent companies from unilaterally adopting a de facto territorial
or exemption system of taxation through inversion transactions. 19
18. See, e.g., Damian Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing Coun-
tries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 30 VA. TAX REV. 467, 473-75
(2000).
19. Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Section 367: A 'Wimp' For Inversions and a 'Bully' For
Real Cross- Border Acquisitions, 94 TAx NOTES 1505 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr., IRC
Section 367: A 'Wimp' for Inversions and a 'Bully' for Real Cross-Border Acquisitions, 26
TAX NoTEs brl'L 587 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Analysis of the Non-Wimpy
Grassley-Baucus Inversion Bill, 26 TAx NOTES INT'i. 741 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr.,
The Non-Wimpy Grassley/Baucus Inversion Bill, 95 TAx NOTES 1515 (2002); Samuel C.
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While inversions undermine the current CFC regime on an ad hoc
and arbitrary basis, the focused tax sparing program proposed here
would be a judicious and carefully focused exception to the cur-
rent system.
Thompson, Jr., Treasury's Inversion Study Misses The Mark: Congress Should Shut Down
Inversions Immediately, 26 TAX NOTES INT'L 969 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Trea-
sury's Inversion Study Misses the Mark, 95 TAX NOTES 1673 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson
Jr., U.S. Treasury Official Gives Unconvincing Reason for Not 'Blockading' Inversions, 26
TAX NOTES INT'L 1321 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Inversion Hearings Focus on
Wrong Issues, 96 T,\x NOTES 154 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Inversion Hearings
Focus on Wrong Issues, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 193 (2002); Samuel C. Thompson Jr., A Criti-
cal Perspective on the Thomas Bill, 96 TAx NOTES 581 (2002).
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